UNFCCC COP

Historical Overview: The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties (or UNFCCC COP) is an annual gathering of policy makers, public and government officials, non-governmental organizations, scientists, advocates and others involved in the discourse on climate change. Each year, member states have to vote on a final text for resolution and participants can have a wide range of types of status from voting delegates to observers to non-observers. Recent COPs have had over 20,000 participants (https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics-on-non-party-stakeholders/statistics-on-participation-and-in-session-engagement).

This conference has met annually since the mid-1990s (with the exception of 2020 because of the COVID pandemic). Over the course of its history, the general trajectory has been to become more globally inclusive (almost every nation in the world is now part of the COP process) and more ambitious over time in the scope of the adopted resolutions. A persistent criticism has been the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the disconnect between the stated objectives in terms of decarbonization and the actual pathways to get there (i.e. since the Paris accord of 2015, the “goal” has been to limit warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, but most expert assessments of the official commitments to decarbonization expect that even if every nation upheld their commitments, the world would reach at least 3C over pre-Industrial levels by the end of the 21st century). There are also perennial challenges of individual nations having competing economic and competitive needs and issues of legacy emissions, historic responsibility, and sometimes widely and rapidly varying policy landscapes (eg. the US position in these negotiations has varied profoundly depending on the political party in power in the US). A historical overview table is shown below:

COP Number	Year	Location	Salient Developments
1	1995	Berlin, Germany	first COP
2	1996	Geneva, Switzerland	called for legally binding targets and favored flexibility
3	1997	Kyoto, Japan	protocol on carbon emissions reduction for Annex 1 high emission countries
4	1998	Buenos Aires, Argentina	two year plan of action following Kyoto Protocol
5	1999	Bonn, Germany	primarily technical – no major conclusions
6	2000	Hague, Netherlands	talks largely collapsed – lots of controversy
7	2001	Marrakesh, Morocco	emissions trading scheme under Clean Development Mechanism agreed upon compliance and accounting frameworks established
8	2002	New Delhi, India	Kyoto ratification held up by US withdrawal, technical focus on technology transfer to low income countries
9	2003	Milan, Italy	focus on adaptation fund and technology transfer
10	2004	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Buenos Aires plan adopted, first discussions of post-Kyoto plans
11	2005	Montreal, Canada	Kyoto Protocol entered into force
12	2006	Nairobi, Kenya	more focus on clean development mechanism and adaptation fund
13	2007	Bali, Indonesia	Bali Action plan for long term for more sustained commitment to decarbonization
14	2008	Poznan, Poland	focus more on financing, including insurance, and forest protection
15	2009	Copenhagen, Denmark	Obama reversed US position from Bush years and attended, the conference did not reach a binding agreement for post-2012/Kyoto, but did provide a framework for wider participation and engagement
16	2010	Cancun, Mexico	Green Climate Fund established, results of IPCC 4 were guiding principle
17	2011	Durban, South Africa	more work on both Green Climate Fund and decarbonization Durban platform adopted
18	2012	Doha, Qatar	Doha amendment to Kyoto Protocol to include second commitment period from 2012-2020, faced some objection language on loss and damage introduced
19	2013	Warsaw, Poland	Warsaw framework on REDD+ (reforestation and avoided deforestation)
20	2014	Lima, Peru	end of commitment period for Kyoto, general goal of reducing emissions to keep temperature rise under 2C
21	2015	Paris, France	major Paris agreement with almost every country a signatory and submitting intended national determined contributions (INDCs) to carbon reductions – new inclusive, but non-binding framework aspirational language of limiting warming to 1.5C above pre-Industrial temperatures adopted
22	2016	Marrakesh, Morocco	focus on water scarcity and water related sustainability
23	2017	Bonn, Germany	progress on implementation of Paris agreement
24	2018	Katowice, Poland	Paris agreement came into force various contributions to various funds and organizations dedication to a future beyond coal
25	2019	Madrid, Spain	was originally supposed to be in Chile, but was moved for political reasons progress on a number of initiatives faltered
26	2021	Glasgow, UK (Scotland)	first post-pandemic COP (originally scheduled for 2020), Glasgow Climate pact on phasing out and phasing down coal use and fossil fuel vehicles
27	2022	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Loss and Damage Fund proposed and agreed
28	2023	Dubai, United Arab Emirates	agreement to transition away from fossil fuels methane reduction agreement adoption of loss and damage fund
29	2024	Baku, Azerbaijan
30	2025	Belem, Brazil

Recent Developments: The fact that COP 28 in 2023 was hosted by a petro-state (United Arab Emirates) was the subject of a lot of criticism and cynicism – much of which was understandable and deserved. However, the final consensus text of COP 28 adopted language that made it clear that there needs to be a global transition away from fossil fuels. While this is obvious to anyone who knows about climate science, this was the first time in the history of the COP that this was stated outright – and the fact that it happened in Dubai is significant. Furthermore, there was an agreement to significantly reduce methane emissions in the oil and gas sectors – something very much needed, but largely consistent with the economic needs of those sectors. Furthermore, there was formal approval of the Loss and Damage Fund which had been proposed at COP 27 and a commitment of about 700 million USD to the Fund. This is very far short of the estimated 400 billion USD cost of climate related disasters on the economies and livelihoods of the global South. But it is a start. For more on some of the key takeaways from COP 28 consult (https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era).

Loss and Damage Fund: At the UNFCCC COP 27 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in 2022, for the first time in the history of the COP process, an agreement was reached to create a “loss and damage fund” to compensate poorer nations for the disproportionate impact of climate change on their populations and economies. Here are links to the UNFCCC press release and a related New York Times article. The amount of money to be initially deposited in this new fund and the rate of increase of its capital seem to have both been left unspecified and, just like with the negotiations at COP 21 in Paris in 2015 regarding the national pledges on emissions reductions, there is no formal, legal mechanism for ensuring that affluent countries contribute to this fund by a specific amount per year or per specified period of time.

Commentary in the US political space has centered on the likelihood that any US contribution or mobilization of resources for this fund are very unlikely in the next Congress as Republicans control of the House of Representatives. Commentary at the international level, especially from poorer countries has focused on the idea that this doesn’t go far enough, has been too long in the making and lacks meaningful enforcement capabilities. The EU was somewhat more proactive about joining this than the US delegation, but they have their own concerns about both economic impacts and energy security with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Pressure on China to act more like a global leader in this space is mounting and this new agreement makes clear that China will not benefit from payouts from this new fund, but stopped short of pressuring China to join the nations that are supposed to contribute to it – at least for now.

There are a lot of critics of this development from multiple angles. In this post, I will try to parse some of these arguments and deconstruct those that I think are wrong and advocate for those that I think are right. Personally, I think this was an important positive step that didn’t go far enough, but was probably the best that could be done given the political, economic and power dynamic realities on the ground.

First, let’s start with some climate facts. The full explanations can be found on the Climate Facts with Explanations page, but to restate the main facts here,

Climate change is already here and is causing significant impacts.
Climate change is largely attributable to human behavior.
Climate change will grow worse in the near future.
The impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt by the poor and vulnerable.
Poor countries have contributed very little to historical emissions, relative to wealthy countries.
Weaning ourselves off of fossil fuel energy will be extremely difficult and will take a long time.
More energy consumption is highly correlated to higher wealth and quality of life.
Human political systems and psychology are poorly designed to address climate change, but better designed to think about shorter term and more local problems.
International climate negotiations have been dominated by countries acting in their own interest.
Funding meaningful climate adaptation activities and damage compensation may not be as expensive as some fear (and the costs of not doing so will eventually be felt by more affluent countries anyway).

This loss and damage fund is a really important development, in large part because so much continued climate change is already baked into the system (point 3), the distribution of damages and historical responsibility for emissions are highly unequal (points 4 and 5) and yet there are bigger forces at play that make rapid decarbonization unlikely (points 6-9). As a matter of human justice, people in the affluent world cannot presume to tell people in the poorer world that they cannot seek economic development to bring about a higher quality of life. Such a suggestion or demand constitutes extreme hypocrisy and lack of empathy.

The norms in the affluent world are along these lines: per capita incomes in excess of 30,000 USD; average lifespans of close to or more than 80 years; high levels of education and literacy; low rates of maternal and infant mortality; and reliable, consistent access to safe drinking water; proper sanitation; abundant energy for a myriad of needs and desires; high speed internet; multiple safe modes of transportation; and diversified, complex economies.

The norms in many of the world’s poorest countries are along these lines: per capita incomes under 5,000 USD (even when adjusted for cost of living); average lifespans in the 50s and 60s; lower levels of education and literacy; higher rates of maternal and infant mortality; limited access to safe drinking water and proper sanitation; limited, inconsistent energy access for a much more restricted set of activities; more limited or frequently interrupted internet; more limited means of transportation and more dangerous road conditions; less diverse economies where more than 50% of the nation’s population is doing subsistence food production (agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries) and the more affluent sections of the economy have a more limited range of services and production.

And yet, our climate is already changing significantly with conditions as they are. If all 8 billion people on the planet had a lifestyle like the typical American, the scale of climate change and biodiversity loss would be extreme and dramatically worse than the present. As a global community, we need to find a path through this mess that acknowledges and respects the realities and inequalities on the ground and human nature, that doesn’t engage in glaring unfair hypocrisies, but that appropriately addresses the urgency of the problem.

A loss and damage fund is a first step down that road (more so than continued impossible empty rhetoric about emissions reduction). Besides the predictable political and perceptual backlash that this development will face, there is also a concern that a loss and damage fund may turn into a money pit and something financially unsustainable. This is not an unreasonable or unfounded concern. But there are many ways in which these type of funds could be developed to offer return on investment: including insurance (rather than outright grants) and microfinance strategies. These types of funding mechanisms can also provide jobs both to people in the Global South, but also to those in the Global North who want to work for development organizations.

Most people in the poorest countries do not want to be dependent on aid from affluent countries – the desire to be self-sufficient is a fairly universal human wish. People in countries that were formerly colonized are often very wary of being “indebted” to institutions or political structures in the former colonial powers (or the post-colonial imperial powers like the US and China). At the same time, there is a very strong need for capital and investment by the economies of many of these countries in order to build a more prosperous future and in order to create the institutions necessary to address their own climate risks. Many large multi-national corporations exploit the natural resources of developing countries without fairly or properly compensating the citizens of those countries and Africa has become a battleground for the competing influence of China, Russia and the US. As a consequence of many of these global forces and environmental and food security stresses, many people in very poor countries are very heavily dependent on humanitarian aid from organizations based in more affluent countries.

At the same time that affluent countries need to take a leadership role in climate finance for loss and damage compensation, they must also be pioneers on the alternative energy and decarbonization fronts. While there are many brilliant, hard working people in the global South, the institutions, resources, investors, research labs and capital necessary to make really profound breakthroughs in alternative energy science and technology that could impact the global scale are much more developed in the global North than in the global South.